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The COBRA Strikes at Group Health
Insurance Plans: Divorced Women's
Rights to Continue Coverage
I. Introduction
Each year, countless marriages break up in either divorce or le-
gal separation. The changes in the wedded partners' relations that
precipitate the end of the marriage are painful. The personal trauma
of divorce often is compounded by radical changes in a person's eco-
nomic lifestyle. Despite the best efforts of family lawyers and equita-
ble distribution laws, one partner frequently emerges from the di-
vorce in a worse financial position than the other. The standard of
living enjoyed during marriage rarely survives the divorce decree.
Equitable distribution laws in most states define the framework
for dismantling the marital estate.' While lawyers on both sides of
the negotiating table can catalogue the perceived injustices in prop-
erty divisions predicated by law, the overall goal of equitable distri-
bution is to minimize the reduction in the standards of living that
often accompany divorce. Recently one settlement inequity has been
the topic of much interest and attention: the availability of continued
health insurance coverage at reasonable group rates for divorced
spouses.'
The most prevalent means of acquiring health insurance is
through an employer-sponsored group health plan.' It is almost un-
heard-of for an employer of any size not to offer membership in a
group health plan to its employees. The concept of the group health
plan is relatively simple: economies of scale allow a large number of
people to band together to take advantage of lower insurance costs
and acquire comprehensive coverage at significantly lower rates than
I. The term "equitable distribution" refers to the disposition of marital property upon
divorce. In Pennsylvania, the term derives from the Domestic Relations Code, which states,
"In a proceeding for divorce or annulment, the court shall ...equitably divide, distribute, or
assign the marital property ...." 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 401(d) (Purdon Supp. 1986).
2. For the purposes of this comment, the terms "divorced spouse" and "divorced
spouses" shall refer, unless otherwise indicated, to those ex-spouses who lose their health insur-
ance by virtue of their divorce.
3. The U.S. House Committee on Education and Labor estimates that eighty-five per-
cent of all those insured for health expenses have group health plan membership. P. Borzi,
Summary of Health Insurance Coverage Act of 1985, 1 (October, 1986) (unpublished manu-
script available through the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Education and La-
bor, Subcommittee on Labor-Management Relations, Washington, D.C.) [hereinafter Borzi].
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they could otherwise acquire individually.'
Spouses frequently endure gaps in their health insurance cover-
age at the time of their divorce. In a single wage-earner family, the
wage-earning spouse frequently carries the other spouse and the de-
pendents on an employer-sponsored group health policy. Even in a
dual-income family, the couple may select just one plan to cover the
whole family because enrollment in two separate plans can be more
expensive. Without prophylactic statutes, divorce would normally
terminate the right of the non-employee spouse to participate in the
plan. 5 Health insurance for the spouse of a group plan member is
contingent upon that spouse's continued relation to the covered em-
ployee. When the marriage ends, so does the coverage.' This is in
contrast to other forms of insurance whose coverage may survive a
divorce.
7
Some divorced spouses obtain new coverage quickly. If em-
ployed, they may be able to avoid a gap in coverage altogether by
immediately enrolling in the group health plan of their own em-
ployer. Other spouses may be able to afford the high rates of private
insurance because of personal assets, alimony, or assets received in
the property settlement. In most divorces, however, non-working
spouses experience a disruption in health coverage because they are
not employed and cannot afford to subscribe to a private health
plan. 8 This gap may only last a short period if the divorced spouse
4. Economies of scale produce lower "marginal costs." Marginal costs are the "increase
or decrease in total cost that materializes as a result of a variation in output." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 497 (Abridged 5th ed. 1983).
5. A typical group policy will include as a dependent of the covered employee "an em-
ployee's spouse who is not legally separated from the employee .... " Provident Mutual Life
Insurance Company of Philadelphia, Certificate of Coverage (Group Policy) 20 (1986) (stan-
dard group policy document). Group policies also customarily have language to the effect that
"insurance with respect to any of [the] covered dependents will terminate on the date upon
which any of the following events occurs: Termination of eligibility as a dependent. ... Id.
at 12.
6. Upon divorce, a divorced spouse ceases to be a dependent of their ex-spouse and no
longer qualifies as a member of the group plan. This disallowance also may affect the children
of the marriage, when custody is awarded to a divorced spouse who has lost health coverage by
virtue of the divorce. See supra note 5.
7. Automobile and homeowners insurance policies attach to insurable interests rather
than to individuals. As such they often survive the divorce intact, preventing a gap in coverage.
8. Private policies usually require the prospective insured to undergo a comprehensive
physical examination. The results of this examination serve to determine whether the insurer
will insure the individual, and if so, at what price. Unlike private health policies, group health
plans customarily do not condition coverage on a showing of insurability. Furthermore, the
premiums are not based on the individual's propensity for medical difficulty. Hence, a prospec-
tive group plan member does not have to pass a physical examination in order to qualify for
the low rates of group health insurance. The lack of a qualifying examination can be a sub-
stantial benefit to divorced spouses whose physical condition might prevent them from acquir-
ing a private policy. Telephone interview with Janet I. Jenson, Esquire, counsel for The Older
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returns to the work force and obtains new coverage. 9 But for many
divorced spouses - the unemployed, uneducated, unskilled, or infirm
- the available solutions are not within reach.
The problem particularly affects spouses who are middle-aged
or older and lack experience in the job market. There are between
four and five million women aged forty to sixty-five who fall into this
uninsured category."0 Unable to find employment that offers mem-
bership in a group health plan as a benefit and unable to afford the
high premiums of a private policy, these ex-spouses are left unin-
sured in a day and age when lack of health insurance means lack of
health care.1'
The federal government has encouraged employers to offer vari-
ous employee benefits by giving favorable tax treatment to employers
who offer employee benefits and penalizing those who don't provide
such benefits.'" Indeed, the popularity of employer-sponsored group
health plans is primarily due to federal tax incentives that permit
employers to deduct the expenses incurred in these ancillary compen-
sation programs.'3 Yet, prior to July 1, 1986,1 no federal incentive
encouraged employers to permit divorced spouses and their custodial
Women's League (October 23, 1986) [hereinafter Jenson].
9. It is customary for group health plans to require an employee to be employed for a
minimum period prior to their becoming eligible to join the plan. See infra note 140 and
accompanying text.
10. See Jenson, supra note 8.
II. Congress has noted:
Since 1977, the number of Americans without any health insurance cover-
age has increased by 40%, from 25 million people to 35 million people, according
to a study conducted by the Department of Health and Human Services. At the
same time that the number of Americans without health insurance is climbing,
the traditional commitment of our country's hospitals to provide charity is erod-
ing. According to the American Hospital Association, I in every 7 community
hospitals adopted explicit limits on charity care in 1982 and 1983 alone.
H.R. REP. No. 241, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. 44 (1985).
12. The Internal Revenue Code (26 U.S.C.) provides that "[tlhere shall be allowed as a
deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in
carrying on a trade or business, including - (I) a reasonable allowance for salaries and other
compensation for personal services actually rendered .... " I.R.C. § 162(a) (West 1978).
Because of the deductions allowed by this section, businesses have been encouraged to estab-
lish additional forms of compensation, such as life insurance, health insurance, and stock-op-
tion programs.
13. id.
14. July 1, 1986 is the effective date of Title X of the Consolidated Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. 99-272, 100 Stat. 222 (1986) (popularly known by the
acronym "COBRA"). Title X (formerly H.R. 3128, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985)) provides for
certain classes of group health plan participants the right to continue their group membership
for a period of time after the date on which they would otherwise lose such coverage. See infra
note 16. The Senate and House adopted a concurrent resolution (H.R. Con. Res. 305, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) in support and explanation of H.R. 3128. For a full discussion of
COBRA, see infra note 39 and accompanying text.
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dependents to remain on the group health plan of their former
spouse. Consequently, the divorced spouse was left with the choice of
attempting to acquire membership in another group plan through
employment, acquiring a higher-priced private health policy, or more
commonly, going without insurance. 5
II. State Continuation Coverage Laws
Some states have responded to the health insurance problems of
divorced spouses by enacting continuation coverage legislation." As
might be expected, there is no uniformity between these state stat-
utes. They vary with respect to the duration of coverage, type of
coverage required, and premium rates.
Illinois has enacted the most thorough continuation coverage
plan of any state. The statute includes operational details that many
other legislatures have neglected. 7 The Illinois statute provides that
divorced spouses over the age of fifty-five may continue on the group
health plan of their former spouse until they are covered by Medi-
care. 8 Divorced spouses under the age of fifty-five may continue on
the plan for two years."' The statute provides that divorced spouses,
employers, and insurers must give one another proper notice in order
to continue coverage. 20 The applicable premium paid by the continu-
15. See supra note 8.
16. Insurance coverage extended to an individual whose coverage would normally be
terminated is referred to as "continuation coverage." Six states have enacted continuation stat-
utes for the benefit of divorced spouses: ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 66-3721 - 66-3730 (Supp. 1986);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38-374 (West 1980); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, §§ 979.2, 979e
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986); S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-35-946 (Law Co-op. 1980); VA. CODE §
38.2-3541 (1985); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 48.44.360 (Supp. 1984). Another seven states
have statutes that provide continuation coverage to other classes of group plan participants:
IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 91B.1, 509A.13 (West Supp. 1986) (confers upon temporarily laid-off
employees and employees on leaves of absences the right to continue on the group plan for a
maximum of six months; also confers upon members of a municipal government group plan
who retire before the age of 65 the right to continue on the group plan until they reach the age
of 65); KANS. STAT. ANN. §§ 304.32-152, 304.38-192 (1981) (confers upon terminated covered
employees and their dependents the right to continue on the group plan for a maximum of nine
months); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:215.7 (West 1983) (confers upon the surviving spouses of
covered employees the right to continue on the group plan for a maximum of 90 days); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 634 (Supp. 1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:27-30 (West 1978)
(confers upon the survivors of a covered employee the right to continue on the group plan for a
maximum of 180 days); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 58-18-7.5 (Supp. 1986) (confers upon ter-
minated employees the right to continue on the group plan for a maximum of three months);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, §§ 4090a-4090c (Supp. 1985) (confers upon the survivors of a covered
employee the right to continue on the group plan for a maximum of six months).
17. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, § 979.2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986).
18. Id. The Medicare program is codified beginning at 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1980).
19. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, § 979.2(D) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986).
20. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, § 979.2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986). The law requires di-
vorced spouses who are interested in the continuation coverage to notify their employer within
thirty days of their divorce decree. Employers are required to notify the insurance company of
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ing spouse is equal to the amount that would be charged if the di-
vorced spouse was an employee on the plan, plus any amount that
the employer would normally contribute.21 In the event that the plan
ceases to provide coverage for all participants, or the continuing par-
ticipant enrolls in another group health plan or remarries, the cover-
age terminates. 2
Although less comprehensive than the Illinois statute, Arkansas
has enacted a similar continuation coverage law.2 3 In contrast to the
Illinois statute, divorced spouses may only continue continue their
coverage for a maximum of 120 days.24 The spouse must request
continuation coverage within ten days of the divorce decree 25 and
must have been enrolled in the group health plan for at least three
months prior to their divorce. 26 Arkansas' continuation coverage is
unavailable to individuals covered by other plans or Medicare2 7 and
does not necessarily include ancillary benefits such as dental, vision,
or prescription drug coverage. 8
Virginia requires all group health plans to offer any beneficiary,
whose coverage would otherwise end, an option to convert29 to a pri-
vate policy with the same insurer or continue on the group health
plan for a maximum of ninety days.30 In order to qualify for continu-
ation coverage, the divorced spouse must have been enrolled in the
plan for at least three months prior to the divorce.31 Premium pay-
ments are determined at the "current rate applicable"; however, the
law does not define that term or indicate how the rate should be
calculated. 2 The statute also fails to address the issue of what notice
must be provided by the ex-spouse, employer, or insurer.
the divorced spouse's interest within fifteen days. The insurance company then has thirty days
in which to send to the divorced spouse information concerning the amount of premiums, the
method and place of payment, and the method of electing the coverage. Upon receipt of this
information, the divorced spouse has thirty days to elect the coverage. Failure to make an
election within this period constitutes a waiver.
21. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, § 979.2(D), (E) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986). If a spouse is
over the age of 55 at the time the continuation coverage begins, the plan will charge an addi-
tional 20% for administration costs after two years of continuation.
22. Id.
23. ARK, STAT. ANN. §§ 66-3721 - 66-3730 (1985).
24. Id. § 66-3727(a).
25. Id. § 66-3725.
26. Id. § 66-3722.
27. Id. § 66-3727(c).
28. Id. § 66-3724.
29. Conversion is the process whereby a group plan member, upon the termination of his
or her group coverage, obtains a private insurance policy from the same insurance company.
30. VA. CODE § 38.2-3541(2)(a) (1982).
31. Id. § 38.2-3541(2)(c).
32. Id. § 38.2-3541(2)(b).
92 DICKINSON LAW REVIEw FALL 1987
South Carolina has a similarly skeletal law.$$ As in the Arkan-
sas and Virginia statutes, a participant must have been enrolled in
the group plan for a minimum of three months before the continua-
tion option vests., ' Upon meeting this minimum enrollment require-
ment, a participant may elect to continue on the plan until the end
of the month following the month in which the spouse would have
lost coverage? 6
As in South Carolina, divorced spouses in Connecticut may con-
tinue as a group member until the end of the month following the
month in which the divorce was decreed .3  The Connecticut law,
however, fails to address the issues of notice, election, and determi-
nation of premiums. Like South Carolina and Arkansas law, the
Connecticut statute fails to address adequately the problem of health
insurance for divorced spouses.
In Washington, the legislature has avoided the problem com-
pletely. The Washington statute places all responsibility on the indi-
vidual to negotiate for continuation coverage with the health care
provider.3 7 Such a law provides no protection for divorced spouses.
The gross disparity of bargaining power between a prospective con-
tinuing participant and the health care provider reduces the Wash-
ington statutory rights to the mere right to inquire what terms of
continuation are available under a group plan.
Viewed as a whole, these state statutes provide a variety of dif-
ferent rules governing the availability of continuation coverage for
divorced spouses. All provide immediate, short-term relief from the
problem of insurance acquisition. With the exception of Illinois,
however, the state statutes are woefully incomplete in their descrip-
tion of the extent of coverage, notice requirements, election proce-
dures, and computation of premiums. Thus, the few states that per-
mit divorced spouses to elect continuation fail to address the overall
problem of preventing a loss of health insurance to divorced
spouses.3"
33. S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-35-946 (Law. Co-op 1978).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38-374(b)(5) (West 1976).
37. WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 48.44.360 (1974).
38. Most state statutes also fail to apply to self-insured plans. Unlike regular group
plans, self-insured plans do not contract with outside insurance companies to insure their mem-
bers. Rather, these sponsors undertake to pool their available funds and insure the members on
their own.
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III. Federal Continuation Coverage Law
A. Introduction
Alerted to the insurance plight of divorced spouses, 39 Congress
addressed the issue in the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconcilia-
tion Act ("COBRA") of 1985.0 In COBRA, Congress added to
three federal laws (the Internal Revenue Code, the Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act, and the Public Health Service Act) by
requiring group health plans to offer continuation coverage to di-
vorced spouses4' for up to thirty-six months.42 Each area of federal
law amended by COBRA now provides its own sanctions for non-
compliance. Such sanctions provide penalties applicable to all group
health plans. 3
COBRA amendments to the Internal Revenue Code" com-
pletely deny the allowance of a business deduction for expenses in-
volved in the maintenance of an employee-sponsored group health
plan if the plan fails to offer continuation coverage to the designated
39. A multitude of special-interest and professional groups united to lobby for a federal
continuation coverage law. The Older Women's League ("OWL") coordinated the efforts of a
coalition of the following concerned organizations: the American Association of University
Women ("AAUW"), Women for Equity in Law, the American Association of Retired Persons
("AARP"), the American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU"), Business and Professional
Women's Clubs, Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, the National Council of Catholic
Women, the National Council of Jewish Women, the National Council of Senior Citizens, the
National Council on the Aging, the National Education Association, the National Organiza-
tion for Women, the National Women's Health Network, the National Women's Political
Caucus, the Women's Legal Defense Fund, the United Methodist Church (Women's Divi-
sion), and the Unitarian Universalist's Association. See Jenson, supra note 8.
40. Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. 99-272, 100 Stat.
222 (1986). For the purposes of this comment, the acronym "COBRA" shall refer only to
Title X of the Act, which addresses the issue of continuation of group health insurance cover-
age. For a legislative background of COBRA, see supra note 15. COBRA's continuation provi-
sions have been codified verbatim in three locations: 26 U.S.C. § 162(k) (the Internal Revenue
Code), 29 U.S.C. § 1161 (the Employee Retirement Income Security Act), and 42 U.S.C. §
300bb-I (the Public Health Service Act). For further discussion of these changes, see infra
notes 61-104 and accompanying text. When possible, all citations to COBRA's provisions will
be made to its codification in the Internal Revenue Code. Otherwise, citations to COBRA shall
refer to Pub. L. 99-272, 100 Stat. 222 (1986).
41. In addition to divorced spouses, COBRA offers continuation coverage to widowed
spouses, dependents who reach the age of majority, fired employees, and those who voluntarily
terminate employment. For a discussion of the qualifications for continuation coverage, see
infra notes 73-80 and accompanying text.
42. The duration of the continuation coverage varies depending upon the attendant cir-
cumstances. See infra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
43. Group health plans sponsored by churches and the federal government are exempt
from COBRA's provisions. I.R.C. § 106(b)(2) (West Supp. 1986). See infra note 63 and ac-
companying text.
44. I.R.C. § 162(i)(2), (k) (West Supp. 1986).
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classes of plan participants." Recognizing that many sponsors of
group health plans are not influenced by the tax consequences of
such a plan, COBRA also amended the Employee Retirement In-
come Security Act ("ERISA")"' by providing a fine for noncompli-
ance.47 In order to compel state and local governments to offer con-
tinuation coverage in their group plans, COBRA also amended the
Public Health Service Act ("PHSA")." These PHSA amendments
authorize lawsuits to compel the group health plan to comply with
the law.' 9
COBRA protects individuals covered by a group health plan
against the sudden loss of health insurance. Designed to fill the in-
surance voids that often accompany major life changes, COBRA
permits plan participants to elect continuation coverage if they
would otherwise lose their eligibility under the plan due to a divorce
from a covered employee, 50 the death or termination of the covered
employee, or emancipation from dependency upon a covered em-
ployee.51 Continuation coverage is optional, and only those who are
eligible for it by virtue of one of the events described above, elect
it,52 and pay for it" receive the continued coverage. In providing
continued group health coverage for divorced spouses and other ben-
eficiaries, Congress has accomplished a rare feat: it has expanded the
social safety net without adding to the federal deficit. COBRA's
unique nature and broad scope merit a closer analysis.5
45. Id. § 162(i)(2).
46. 29 US.C.A. § 1001 (West Supp. 1986).
47. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132(c) (1986).
48. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 300bb-l - 300bb-8 (West Supp. 1986).
49. Id. § 300bb-7. For a discussion of sanctions, see infra notes 65-72 and accompanying
text.
50. A "covered employee" is defined as "an individual who is [or was] provided coverage
under a group health plan by virtue of the individual's employment or previous employment
with an employer." I.R.C. § 162(k)(7)(A) (West Supp. 1986).
51. I.R.C. § 162(k)(3) (West Supp. 1986). Divorce, death, termination of employment,
and emancipation are "qualifying events" that trigger COBRA's continuation coverage provi-
sions. For a further discussion of the events that trigger COBRA, see infra notes 73-80 and
accompanying text.
52. For a discussion of the election of continuation coverage, see infra notes 95-98 and
accompanying text.
53. For a discussion of premium payments, see infra notes 90-94 and accompanying
text.
54. The two Congressional chambers had slightly different objectives in mind as they
drafted the legislation. Focusing on the needs of widowed and divorced spouses, the Senate
Labor and Education Committee "was concerned that certain spouses and dependent children
[might] be deprived of health benefits due to an unexpected change in family status." S. REP.
No. 146, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. 363 (1985). The House sought to allow continuation for five
years. H.R. REP. No. 241, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. 151 (1985).
COBRA STRIKES BACK
B. Status of Federal Law Prior to COBRA
Prior to the enactment of COBRA, there was no federal re-
quirement that employer-sponsored group health plans contain con-
tinuation options in order to qualify for favorable tax treatment
under section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code. With the exception
of I.R.C. section 162(i)(1), which prevented group health plans from
terminating the membership of an individual suffering from End-
Stage Renal Disease,55 there were no provisions in the Internal Rev-
enue Code, ERISA, or PHSA that required employers to offer con-
tinuing health care coverage.
Before the enactment of COBRA, tax laws gave incentives to
encourage employers to provide health benefits to their employees."
An employer's contributions to group health plans are deductible5 7
as an ordinary and necessary business expense as long as the insur-
ance benefits are paid to the employee, not the employer." The por-
tion of the employee's premium paid by the employer is not included
in the employee's gross income." For self-insured employers, the
same favorable tax treatment was afforded to the extent that all em-
ployees received the benefits of the health insurance and the plan did
not discriminate in favor of highly compensated employees.60
C. The ABCs of COBRA
1. Group Health Plans Affected by COBRA.-Over 1.7 mil-
lion group health plans are affected by COBRA's continuation provi-
sions.61 These provisions apply to all group plans providing medical
care as defined by the Internal Revenue Code.62 Therefore, any plan
55. Congress adopted this unique continuation provision as part of a series of laws aimed
at benefiting patients with End-Stage Renal Disease, a life-threatening kidney disorder. At the
urging of the Intersociety Committee for Kidney Research and the National Kidney Founda-
tion, and with the advice of the Renal Physicians Association, Congress sought to stabilize the
costs of outpatient dialysis treatment and encourage less-costly home dialysis treatment.
56. I.R.C. § 162(a)(1) (West 1978). See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
57. I.R.C. § 162(a)(1) (West 1978).
58. Treas. Reg. 1.162-10(a), Rev. Rul. 58-90, 1958-1 C.B. 88.
59. I.R.C. § 106(a) (West 1978).
60. I.R.C. § 105(h) (West 1978).
61. U.S. Department of Labor, Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration, News Re-
lease 86-268 at I (June 26, 1986) (available through the Office of Regulations and Interpreta-
tions, Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration, U.S. Department of Labor, Washington,
D.C.).
62. I.R.C. § 162(i)(3) defines "group health plans" as "any plan of, or contributed to by,
an employer to provide medical care (as defined in section 213(d)) to his employees, former
employees, or the families of such employees or former employees, directly through insurance,
reimbursement, or otherwise." I.R.C. § 162(i)(3) (West 1978).
I.R.C. § 213(d) provides in pertinent part:
(I) the term 'medical care' means amount paid -
92 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW FALL 1987
providing insurance for traditional medical, dental, prescription
drug, vision, hearing, or substance abuse expenses must comply with
the new law. The only plans exempt from the continuation require-
ments are those sponsored by some small employers, churches, and
the federal government. 3 Because COBRA has been incorporated
into ERISA, its continuation requirements will apply to many, but
not all nonprofit employers." '
2. Effective Dates and Penalties-Effective for group health
plans whose plan year begins on or after July 1, 1986,11 employers
and plan sponsors who fail to comply with COBRA's provisions are
subject to the various penalties enumerated in the Internal Revenue
Code, ERISA, and the PHSA. Employers whose compliance is com-
pelled under the Internal Revenue Code may have the most to lose
(A) for the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of
disease, or for the purpose of affecting any structure or function of the
body,
(B) for transportation primarily for and essential to medical care re-
ferred to in subparagraph (A), or,
(C) for insurance (including amount paid as premiums under part B
of title XV Ill of the Social Security Act, relating to supplementary medi-
cal insurance for the aged) covering medical care referred to in subpara-
graphs (A) and (B).
I.R.C. § 213(d) (West 1978).
63. I.R.C. § 162(i)(2)(B) provides that the penalty imposed by Section 162(i)(2)(A)
(denial of a business deduction for failure to comply with COBRA) "shall not apply to any
plan described in section 106(b)(2)."
I.R.C. § 106(b)(2) provides:
(A) group health plan for any calendar year if all employers maintaining
such plan normally employed 20 or fewer employees on a typical day during the
preceding year,
(B) governmental plan (within the meaning of section 414(d)), or
(C) church plan (within the meaning of 414(e)).
I.R.C. § 414(d) provides in pertinent part that "the term 'governmental plan' means a
plan established and maintained for its employees by the Government of the United States,
...or by any agency or instrumentality of [the United States]." Unlike the group health
plans of the federal government, plans sponsored by state and local governments are affected
by COBRA's amendments to the Public Health Service Act. The problems associated with
exclusions are discussed infra, notes 143-46.
I.R.C. § 414(e) provides in pertinent part that "the term 'church plan' means a plan
established and maintained ...by a church or by a convention or association of churches
which is exempt under section 501 [26 U.S.C. § 501]."
64. Because of COBRA's codification in ERISA, which applies to non-profit employers,
the only non-profit group plans exempt from COBRA are those that can meet the rule for
excepting employers of less than 20 people. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1161(b) (West Supp. 1986) (this
exemption also applies to those plans whose compliance is compelled under I.R.C. §§
106(b)(2), 162(i)(2)(B) (West Supp. 1986) and PHSA, 42 U.S.C.A. § 300bb-l(b)(1) (West
Supp. 1986).
65. The Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA), Pub. L.
99-272, §§ 10001(e), 10002(d), 10003(b), 100 Stat. 82, 227, 231, 236 (1986) provides special
rules for collective bargaining agreements. For collective bargaining agreements ratified before
April 7, 1986, the continuation requirements commence on the later of the date on which the
present agreement relating to the plan ends or January I, 1987.
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by non-compliance. They stand to lose their tax deductions for all
group health plans maintained by the employer, not just for the plan
that fails to offer continuation coverage. Clearly, this is a very seri-
ous penalty for an employer to incur. Depending on the corporate
structure of an employer, the failure to offer continuation coverage
in the group health plan of a single subsidiary might result in a de-
nial of a business deduction for all corporate contributions to group
health plans.66
In addition to affecting profit-oriented employers, COBRA also
applies to non-profit group health plans. Because nonprofit employers
do not pay an income tax, denial of a tax deduction is an ineffective
method to compel compliance. Therefore, COBRA incorporates the
continuation requirements into ERISA, which applies to non-profit
employers. Under ERISA, the plan administrator 7 can be held per-
sonally liable to a damaged participant.66 While holding an individ-
ual liable for what may be an institutional fault seems harsh, this
penalty is undoubtedly a strong incentive for compliance.
Under the PHSA provisions, plan non-compliance will be pun-
ished by the penalty of "appropriate equitable relief."6 9 This could
include specific performance or an injunction to enforce continuation
coverage. For "highly compensated individuals, ' 70 the employer's
failure to comply with COBRA results in the inclusion of the em-
ployer's contributions to the group health plan in the employee's
gross income. 7 1 This denial of the income exclusion applies to all
highly compensated individuals, whether or not they were members
of the plan. 2
66. This would result when a large corporation offers to its subsidiaries membership in a
group health plan sponsored in the name of the parent company. This result also would hinge
upon judicial interpretation of the term "employer."
67. The terms "plan administrator" and "employer" are not necessarily synonymous. In
the majority of group health plans, the employer, when contracting with an insurer for cover-
age, will also contract for the insurer to administer the plan. Plan administration includes the
processing of applications, premium payments, and claims for benefits. Telephone interview
with Eleanor A. Wenner, Federal Relations Representative, Health Insurance Association of
America (October 21, 1986) [hereinafter Wenner].
68. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c), as amended by COBRA § 10002(b). Personal liability of a
plan administrator can be as much as $100 a day. Before COBRA, this penalty was assessable
against a plan administrator only for the failure to disseminate requested benefits information.
69. 42 US.C.A. § 300bb-7 (West Supp. 1987).
70. A "highly compensated employee" is a person who is one of the five highest paid
officers, a 10% shareholder, or in the top 25% of paid employees. I.R.C. §§ 105(h)(5),
106(b)(1) (West 1978).
71. I.R.C. § 106(b) (West 1978).
72. The rationale for this provision is that "highly compensated employees" typically
wield great influence in their company and are able to exert pressure upon the employer to
comply with the law. If a failure to comply with COBRA penalizes those who possess company
power, it is assumed that those individuals will ensure that COBRA's continuation require-
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3. Qualification for Continuation Coverage.-COBRA's con-
tinuation provisions apply to both covered employees 73 and their ben-
eficiaries who have experienced a "qualifying event."'7 4 Covered indi-
viduals who have experienced a qualifying event are referred to as
"qualified beneficiaries. ' 75 Divorce is one of the enumerated qualify-
ing events.70 Other qualified beneficiaries include widowed spouses, 7
ments are met. The wisdom of this provision is open to debate. It seems manifestly unfair that
an employee, albeit a powerful and highly paid employee, who may have nothing to do with
benefits administration and personnel matters, should be punished for a failure to comply with
COBRA. The assumption justifying this provision is tenuous and could lead to absurd results.
To illustrate, consider a major league baseball club. The club employs twenty-five players (all
of whose salaries invariably exceed all other organizational salaries), roughly ten coaches,
trainers, and related personnel, and perhaps as many as sixty administrative and organiza-
tional personnel. Under the COBRA penalties and the Internal Revenue Code's definition of
highly compensated employees, the 25 players would be penalized for the failure of the club's
plan administrator (who is likely to be someone not employed by the Club, see supra note 67)
to comply with COBRA's continuation coverage requirements. As much as professional ath-
letes hold influential positions in our society, it strains the imagination to suggest that they
have the organizational power to compel compliance with COBRA. Furthermore, determining
who qualifies as a "highly compensated employee" can be a difficult process, as it requires a
valuation of such intangible and uncertain compensation alternatives as stock options, bonuses,
health plans, life insurance plans, and perhaps even usage of the employee discount.
73. COBRA defines "covered employees" as "an individual who is (or was) provided
coverage under a group health plan by virtue of the individual's employment or previous em-
ployment with an employer." I.R.C. § 162(k)(7) (West Supp. 1986).
74. COBRA defines a "qualifying event" as:
(A) The death of the covered employee.
(B) The termination (other than by reason of such employee's gross miscon-
duct), or reductions of hours, of the covered employee's employment.
(C) The divorce or legal separation of the covered employee from the em-
ployee's spouse.
(D) The covered employee becoming entitled to benefits under [Medicare].
(E) A dependent child ceasing to be a dependent child under the generally
applicable requirement of the plan.
I.R.C. § 162(k)(3) (West Supp. 1986).
COBRA also provides that should a qualified beneficiary experience more than one quali-
fying event, the maximum period allotted for continuation coverage is thirty-six months from
the date of the first event. Id. § 162(k)(2)(B)(i)(Il). Thus, if a terminated employee has
elected to continue on the plan and subsequently becomes divorced, the divorced spouse will
have a maximum continuation period of thirty-six months from the date the employee-spouse
was terminated.
75. COBRA defines "qualified beneficiary" as follows:
(i) In general.-The term "qualified beneficiary" means, with respect to a
covered employee under a group health plan, any other individual who, on the
day before the qualifying event for that employee, is a beneficiary under the
plan-
(I) as the spouse of the covered employee, or
(11) as the dependent child of the employee.
(ii) Special rule for terminations and reduced employment.-ln the case of
a qualifying event described in paragraph (3)(B) [termination of employment],
the term "qualified beneficiary" includes the covered employee.
I.R.C. § 162(k)(7)(B) (West Supp. 1986). The term "qualified beneficiary" as used in this
comment shall refer to both covered employees and their beneficiaries who, due to the occur-
rence of a qualifying event, become entitled to continuation coverage.
76. I.R.C. § 162(k)(3)(C) (West Supp. 1986).
77. Id. § 162(k)(A).
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employees who voluntarily terminate employment,7 8 fired employ-
ees, 9 and dependent children who reach the age of majority.80
4. Duration and Breadth of Coverage under COBRA.-Group
health plan participants who experience a qualifying event are enti-
tled to continue as a member of the plan for up to three years.8"
Continuation coverage will terminate prematurely if the qualified
beneficiary fails to pay the premium, becomes entitled to Medicare
benefits, or becomes covered under another group health plan. 2 Sim-
ilarly, coverage terminates if the sponsoring employer ceases to pro-
vide any group health plan to any employee.83
COBRA's goal is to allow qualified beneficiaries to continue the
same type of health coverage that they enjoyed prior to the qualify-
ing event.84 According to a Senate Report, the continuation coverage
offered to a qualified beneficiary must be identical to the coverage
provided immediately before the qualifying event.8"
The statutory language requires a qualified beneficiary to re-
ceive the same coverage options as a regular participant who is "sim-
ilarly situated."88 An early summary of COBRA's requirements
noted:
Although the phase "similarly situated individuals" is not
defined in the statute, the [House and Senate] Conference Com-
78. Id. § 162(k)(B). This definition encompasses all employees who voluntarily leave
employment for any reason including early retirees.
79. Id. Employees who are fired for "gross misconduct" are not eligible for COBRA's
protection. Congress did not define what constitutes "gross misconduct," but some observers
suggest that it represents "almost a criminal standard." Many Questions Generated at Semi-
nar on COBRA's Continuation Requirements, 13 PENSION REP. (BNA) 1305, 1306 (July 28,
1986).
80. I.R.C. § 162(k)(E) (West Supp. 1986).
81. Id. § 162(k)(2)(b)(i)(llI). An exception to this general rule states that qualified
beneficiaries who are eligible for continuation coverage by virtue of termination of employment
by the covered employee or by a reduction in the hours of a covered employee may continue on
the group health plan for a maximum of 18 months. Id. § 162(k)(2)(B)(ii).
82. I.R.C. § 162(k)(2)(B) (West Supp. 1986).
83. Id. § 162(k)(2)(B)(ii).
84. S. REP. No. 99th Cong., 2nd Sess. 364 (1986).
85. "In general, the continuation coverage ... must be ... identical to the coverage
provided immediately before the qualifying event." Id.
86. I.R.C. Section 162(k)(2)(A) defines the extent of the required coverage as follows:
(A) Type of benefit coverage.-The coverage must consist of coverage
which, as of the time the coverage is being provided, is identical to the coverage
provided under the plan to similarly situated beneficiaries under the plan with
respect to whom a qualifying event has not occurred. If the coverage under the
plan is modified for any group of similarly situated beneficiaries, the coverage
shall also be modified in the same manner for all individuals who are qualified
beneficiaries under the plan pursuant to this subsection in connection with such
group.
I.R.C. § 162(k)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1986).
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mittee Report . . . indicates that the Committee does not intend
for the statute to require, or to permit, plans to establish groups
of beneficiaries determined on factors that violate the Equal Pay
Act [an antidiscrimination law]. Furthermore, employees may
not be grouped so inappropriately as to increase the costs to the
rank and file.
87
Many employers and insurers have questioned whether the con-
tinuation coverage must provide for such ancillary medical benefits
as dental, vision, and hearing care.88 These types of benefits do fall
within the rubric of COBRA's definition of medical benefits in a
group health plan.89 Therefore, the answer to this question hinges on
whether the qualified beneficiary's coverage prior to the qualifying
event included such benefits. If it did, then these benefits must also
be extended to the continuing qualified beneficiary.
5. Premiums for Continuing Participants.-COBRA's pre-
mium requirement helps ease the employer's burden. Those who
elect continuation coverage may be required to pay up to 102% of
the applicable premium.90 The extra fee is designed to minimize the
potential for disproportionate increases in administrative costs.
Conscious of the burden that an increase in the number of par-
ticipants would impose on an insurer, Congress has allowed the total
costs of the group health plan, from which the premium rate is de-
rived, to include the costs associated with continuing coverage in ad-
dition to the costs associated with regular participants.91 This allows
plans to adjust to the expanded beneficiary pool by spreading the
costs associated with the continuing beneficiaries over the entire plan
membership. The continuing beneficiary's premium must be estab-
87. P. Hamburger, New Law Makes Substantial Changes in Private Health Insurance
Coverage Plans, 65 J. TAx'N 34 (1986) (citing H.R. REP. No. 453, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 566
(1986)).
88. Employers Should Make "Good Faith" Efforts To Comply With COBRA Health
Care Provisions, 13 PENSION REP. (BNA) 1151 (June 23, 1986) [hereinafter Good Faith Ef-
forts]; see also Frank B. Hall Consulting Company, Benefit Update 86-11 at I (May 1986)
(unpublished bulletin available through the Frank B. Hall Consulting Company, New York,
N.Y., and through the International Foundation of Employee Benefit Plans, Brookfield, WI).
89. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
90. I.R.C. § 162(k)(2)(C)(i) (West Supp. 1986). The extra two percent is a late addition
to COBRA; earlier versions of the continuation coverage bill did not provide for it. H.R. REP.
No. 241, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. 45 (1985).
91. H.R. REP. No. 241, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. 45 (1985). The House Report states that
"the total of all premiums charged by the plan in any plan year may be based upon reasonably
anticipated community costs for such plan year of the entire pool of insured employees and
other qualified beneficiaries under the plan, including persons receiving continuation cover-
age." Id.
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lished in advance and based on a 12-month period. 92 Therefore, no
plan is locked into a premium rate for over one year. This helps min-
imize the inequities that could result from excessive or insufficient
premium rates charged in any given year. The ability to adjust pre-
miums annually allows plans to respond to the amount of benefits
required by continuing beneficiaries, to correct actuarial projections,
and to adjust to unforeseen administrative costs.
Unlike any of the state laws on continuation coverage, COBRA
also applies to self-insured plans." Treating self-insurers differently,
COBRA allows the self-insured plan to calculate the cost (and hence
the premium rates) in one of two ways: either on an actuarial basis,
or on an analysis of the previous year's costs."4 The object of either
method is to ensure that the premium rate charged to a continuing
participant accurately reflects the costs to the plan for the
continuance.
92. I.R.C. § 162(k)(4)(C) (West Supp. 1986).
93. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
94. COBRA provides:
Special rule for self-insured plans.-To the extent that a plan is a self-in-
sured plan-
(i) In general.-Except as provided in clause (ii), the applicable pre-
mium for any period of continuation coverage shall be equal to a reasona-
ble estimate of the cost of providing such period for similarly situated
individuals which -
(I) is determined on an actuarial basis, and
(11) takes into account such factors as the Secretary may pre-
scribe in regulations.
(ii) Determination on basis of past cost.-lf a plan administrator
elects to have this clause apply, the applicable premium for any period of
continuation coverage of qualified beneficiaries shall be equal to-
(I) the cost to the plan for similarly situated beneficiaries for
the same period occurring during the preceding determination pe-
riod under subparagraph (C), adjusted by
(11) the percentage increase or decrease in the implicit price
deflator of the gross national product (calculated by the Depart-
ment of Commerce and published in the Survey of Current Busi-
ness) for the 12-month period ending on the last day of the sixth
month of such preceding determination period.
(iii) Clause (ii) not to apply where significant change.-A plan ad-
ministrator may not elect to have clause (ii) apply in any case in which
there is a significant difference, between the determination period and the
preceding determination period, in coverage under, or in employees cov-
ered by, the plan. The determination under the preceding sentence for
any determination period shall be made at the same time as the determi-
nation under subparagraph (C).
I.R.C. § 162(k)(4)(B) (West Supp. 1986).
These alternative methods allow the self-insurer to choose between a premium based on
an actuarial basis and one based on a more thorough analysis. The latter method, which
utilizes the Gross National Product implicit price deflator, is the more costly of the two meth-
ods; its expense may outweigh its benefit. Furthermore, this alternative method may not be
used if there has been a significant difference in the coverage provided to employees, or in the
number of employees covered by the plan. Id.
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6. COBRA's Election and Notice Provisions.-In order for
COBRA to have any affect on the problem of health insurance con-
tinuation, qualified beneficiaries must be aware of their new rights.
Congress included a costly, yet comprehensive notification scheme in
COBRA." Under these provisions, all employees and their spouses
must receive notice of their general rights as soon as COBRA ap-
plies to that plan." Thereafter, all newly covered employees and
their spouses must receive notice of COBRA's continuation provi-
sions at the time they commence participation in a group health
plan.
Upon the occurrence of a qualifying event, another round of no-
tice-giving begins. After the divorce is finalized, a divorced spouse
has sixty days in which to notify the plan administrator of the di-
vorce.97 In return, the plan administrator has fourteen days98 in
which to inform the divorced spouse of his or her continuation
rights.99
A divorced spouse and any other qualified beneficiaries living at
the same residence must elect continuation coverage within sixty
days following notice from the plan administrator of their continua-
tion rights.100 When the divorced spouse has custody of children, the
parent's election serves as the election for all other qualified benefi-
95. Id. § 162(k)(6).
96. For a discussion of COBRA effective dates, see supra notes 73-74 and accompany-
ing text. This immediate notice clause has proven to be a cumbersome requirement, especially
for those companies whose group health plans were affected in July 1986. Until the Depart-
ment of Labor issued a "model notice" form on June 26, 1986, - a mere 5 days before some
plans were affected - employers had no understanding of what type of "notice" was required.
Given the stern penalties imposed on an employer for noncompliance, employers were justifia-
bly impatient to receive some indication of what this initial notice must include. The Labor
Department indicated that dissemination to employees and their spouses of the Model Nqotice
(which contained minor inaccuracies and received much criticism from various employer-lob-
bies) would be considered "good faith compliance" with the law. U.S. Department of Labor,
Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration, News Release 86-268 (June 26, 1986).
97. I.R.C. § 162(k)(5)(C) (West Supp. 1986). Dependents who reach the age of major-
ity, or under other circumstances are no longer dependents of the covered employee also must
notify the plan administrator within 60 days. In the cases of all other qualifying events, the
employer must notify the plan administrator of the occurrence of a qualifying event within 30
days. Id. § 162(k)(5)(B).
98. The 14 day requirement mandates the prompt response of a plan administrator to
the notice of a qualifying event. In consideration of the strong penalties imposed for noncom-
pliance, discussed supra notes 67-72 and accompanying text, this quick response may be par-
ticularly onerous to administrators. The need for great efficiency in processing notifications is
likely to increase the costs of plan administration.
99. I.R.C. § 162(k)(5)(B) (West Supp. 1986). Congress intends that in the common
situation when a divorced spouse has custody of children, notice to the ex-spouse of the contin-
uation rights constitutes notice to the other qualified beneficiaries living at the same residence.
Id.
100. Id. § 162(k)(5)(A).
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ciaries.10 1 In the common situation when a qualified beneficiary has
a choice from among several different group health plan options,
however, each qualified beneficiary is entitled to a separate elec-
tion.102 If the qualified beneficiary elects to continue coverage within
the sixty day election period, coverage is retroactive to the date on
which the qualified beneficiary would otherwise have been termi-
nated from the plan. 0 After election of coverage, the qualified ben-
eficiary has up to forty-five days to pay the first premium (which
must include payment for all coverage extended up to the date of
payment) °104
D. Critique of COBRA
In extending the right to continue on a group health plan to
divorced spouses and other qualified beneficiaries, Congress has cre-
ated a new social welfare program without directly increasing the
federal budget. Aside from the costs experienced by three depart-
ments in promulgating regulations,108 no outlay of federal funds is
required to sponsor the increased health coverage. Indeed, one rea-
son the House Ways and Means Committee sponsored continuation
coverage was to provide continued access to affordable private health
insurance.10 6
Those who promoted COBRA's continuation coverage provi-
sions10 7 are extremely pleased with its impact on divorced spouses.
Supporters indicate that broadcasts of the news of COBRA has
reaped a flood of support.108 Divorced spouses - notably, divorced
101. Id. § 162(k)(5)(B).
102. Thus, for example, when a divorced spouse selects a certain type of coverage from
the various types offered in the group plan, his or her dependents also would be permitted to
make a choice. In the absence of an election to the contrary, it is assumed that the parent's
choice is also the dependent's choice.
103. S. REP. No. 146, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. 364 (1985).
104. I.R.C. § 162(k)(2)(C) (West Supp. 1986).
105. Congress has authorized three executive departments to promulgate regulations to
govern the operation of COBRA's continuation coverage provisions. According to the Congres-
sional Conference Committee report, the Secretary of Labor will promulgate regulations con-
cerning disclosure and reporting, the Secretary of the Treasury will issue regulations defining
the extent of coverage, and the Secretary of Health and Human Services will regulate the
state and local government plans affected by COBRA. HR. REP. No. 453, 99th Cong., 2nd
Sess. 562 (1986) (reprinted in 131 CONG. REC. 13,249-50). Pending the release of regulations,
employers are instructed to act in "good faith compliance with a reasonable interpretation
. .Id. at 563.
106. HR. REP. No. 241, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. 44 (1985).
107. See supra note 39.
108. The Older Women's League, which spearheaded the lobbying efforts in support of
continuation coverage for divorced spouses, reports that all classes of beneficiaries have praised
the rights that the law confers. See Jenson, supra note 8.
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women - have greeted the new law enthusiastically." '
Yet even programs free of federal cost are not without criticism.
Employer and insurance groups have developed a healthy distaste for
it, finding what they believe are some unreasonable provisions. 110
Some complaints are directed less at the COBRA provisions than at
the nature of COBRA itself. Employers that offer group health plans
to their employees have philosophical objections to the requirement
that they administer a benefit program to people with whom they
have no continuing relationship."' Other criticisms highlight specific
provisions of the new law.' 1 2 Valid criticisms can be made concern-
ing (1) the costs to employers, (2) the types of plans affected by
COBRA, (3) the types of people who are eligible for the coverage,
and (4) the type of coverage required.
1. Administrative Costs.-COBRA allows employers to
charge continuing participants 102% of the applicable premium. " 3
Employers claim that compliance with COBRA will increase admin-
istrative costs well beyond the two percent figure that they are reim-
bursed."" Although it is still too early for any reliable empirical data
to support such charges," 5 some critics predict that premiums of
110% to 140% of the "applicable premium" would be necessary to
meet the additional costs."' In the absence of regulations to the con-
trary, employers fear that the premiums charged to continuing par-
ticipants will not be sufficient to cover the overall costs of the plan.
Despite the lack of data, the administrative burden cannot be
overlooked. Indeed, the Senate was well aware that a burden might
be transferred to employers. It noted that some of the administrative
109. Id. By contrast, one COBRA critic has proclaimed that "[COBRA] is really a
'screw the employer' piece of legislation." See Good Faith Efforts, supra note 88, at 1153.
110. J. Geisel, Employers Urge Changes in COBRA Health Plan Rules, 20 Bus. INS. I
(1986).
I1I. According to a spokesperson for the National Association of Third-Party Adminis-
trators, a Washington-based professional association for benefits administrators, this objection
underlies all other COBRA criticism. Telephone interview with Tracy Gilliland, Legislative
Aide, National Association of Third-Party Administrators (October 23, 1986) [hereinafter
Gilliland].
112. Congress has already responded to the initial cries by passing nine so-called "tech-
nical amendments" as part of HR. 3838, the comprehensive Tax Reform Act of 1986. The
amendments, consisting of clarifications and re-wording of ambiguous language in the original
bill, have been incorporated into the present law.
113. See supra notes 90-94 and accompanying text.
114. Geisel, supra note 110. See also 2 COMPENSATION & BENEFITS FILE 2-3 (May
1986).
115. The lack of verifiable cost estimates has not prevented COBRA opponents from
parading cost-oriented complaints before the regulatory departments and Congressmen.
116. Geisel, supra note 110, at 34.
COBRA STRIKES BACK
costs of continuation coverage, including the administrative costs of
processing the election, could be charged to the qualified benefi-
ciary. 117 Administrative costs include the costs of processing the
qualified beneficiary elections and the costs of notifying plan partici-
pants. The one-time cost of the initial notice to all group members is,
in itself, a huge administrative task. In the absence of regulation to
the contrary, these overhead costs of notifying participants and col-
lecting premiums must be borne by the employer."'
Additionally, keeping track of former employees and former
spouses of employees will increase the administrative tab. Congress
confounded the problem of administrative costs by failing to specify
what costs could be considered when calculating the annual applica-
ble premium."' Moreover, many plans - especially the smaller ones
- may not possess the cost data to establish the premium. 120 It is
not clear whether any departmental regulations will address this is-
sue, nor is it clear which department could develop the regulations.
There are possible remedies for the problem of administrative
costs. The most obvious solution would be to petition Congress to
allow a greater surcharge than the present two percent. This is a
difficult solution, however, because the cumbersome Congressional
process makes passage of amendments time-consuming and uncer-
tain. Such a solution should only be sought if an entire reassessment
of the costs of COBRA is necessary.
A more expedient, yet equally effective solution would be for
the Treasury Department, as part of its regulatory duties, to define
"applicable premium" in a manner that encompasses all administra-
tive costs. To the extent that the extra costs involved in continuation
coverage are a portion of the overall administrative financial burden
of the entire plan, the administrative costs of COBRA's coverage
should be spread out over the entire body of participants. It is not
clear, however, whether COBRA's definition of "applicable pre-
117. The Senate report states that "[u]nder [COBRA], some or all of the cost continua-
tion (including reasonable administrative costs of processing the election) could be charged to
the beneficiary." S. REP. No. 146, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. 365 (1985). The Senate report does
not address the other administrative costs (such as the cost of providing notices and collecting
premiums) incurred in providing continuation coverage.
118. Telephone interview with Carroll Calloway, Esquire, General Counsel, Health In-
surance Association of America, (October 25, 1986) [hereinafter Calloway].
119. See supra notes 90-94 and accompanying text.
120. The ERISA Industry Committee ("ERIC") notes that "[many plans do not have
cost figures for spouses and dependent children. ... Proposed Technical Corrections to CO-
BRA's Health Care Continuation Provisions, The ERISA Industry Committee 2 (June 13,
1986) (available through ERIC, 1726 M St., Washington, D.C.).
92 DICKINSON LAW REVIEw FALL 1987
mium"'' permits this type of cost-spreading. Given the harsh penal-
ties visited upon a noncomplying employer, few plan sponsors will be
willing to risk legal sanctions to set premiums in this manner. A reg-
ulation authorizing such a practice is recommended.
A regulatory clarification in this regard would compliment the
existing annual premium adjustment.12 For each continuing benefi-
ciary, the employer may re-establish the applicable premium annu-
ally. This means that if a divorced spouse needs all three years of
continuation coverage, the employer will be able to make two adjust-
ments of the initial premium. If the premium charged includes a
pro-rata portion of the total administrative costs, the annual adjust-
ment can ensure that each continuing participant pays the true cost
of his or her coverage.
Directly related to the cost problem are employers' concerns
over "adverse selection."' 2 Adverse selection occurs when those who
select insurance have pre-existing medical conditions which require
coverage in excess of the premiums that they are required to pay.
Adverse selectors have greater medical bills than regular plan par-
ticipants. The phenomenon of adverse selection would have an unfa-
vorable affect on the entire plan because the greater costs associated
with adverse selectors will increase the premiums for all benefi-
ciaries. Because COBRA is still a new law, 2 4 it is premature to
make any conclusions as to whether adverse selection will occur
under COBRA.
COBRA's critics assert that the lengthy notice and election pe-
riods provide a potential for adverse selection. 2 ' Qualified benefi-
ciaries have at least sixty days to make an election, 2 6 plus another
forty-five days before the first premium is due. 27 Hence, the critics
conclude, a prospective continuing beneficiary could wait nearly 105
days before paying the applicable premium for continuing coverage.
If, during this lengthy period, the qualified beneficiary incurred med-
ical expenses in excess of the premiums, he or she would enroll in the
plan. If not, the critics argue, the qualified beneficiary would let the
121. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
122. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
123. Gilliland, supra note 111.
124. For a discussion of the effective dates of COBRA, see supra note 66 and accompa-
nying text.
125. See Good Faith Efforts, supra note 88, at 1153.
126. For a discussion of the election process, see supra note 65 and accompanying text.
127. For a discussion of the periods for premium payment, see supra notes 90-94 and
accompanying text.
COBRA STRIKES BACK
premium lapse, and waive continuation coverage. 128
The fear of adverse selection, as exemplified in the above scena-
rio, fails, with rare exceptions, to comport with the reality of human
experience. First, the hypothetical scenario seems to ignore the fact
that COBRA allows some qualified beneficiaries to continue up to
three years.' 2  In most cases a divorced spouse will not be quick to
conclude that merely because his or her medical expenses did not
exceed the premiums during the notice and election periods that the
same would hold true over the remaining thirty-two months of con-
tinuation coverage. A three and a half month period is simply not an
accurate predictor of future medical expenses. Most people have no
basis from which to make such predictions about future medical
expenses.
Second, although some qualified beneficiaries will enroll in con-
tinuation coverage with known medical problems, these qualified
beneficiaries are not new participants in the group health plan; they
are continuing the coverage which they have been enjoying for some
time. Thus, COBRA does not open the health plan to newcomers
laden with new burdens for the insurer to shoulder. Instead, COBRA
merely prolongs the insurer's obligation to insure an existing partici-
pant. A group plan is not unaware of the health conditions of those
whom it insures. The insurer may, in pricing the product offered to
employers, consider that it will be covering some individuals longer
than it did under previous plans.
Last, adverse selection can be a self-fulfilling prophesy.3 0 If
employers highlight COBRA's benefits and encourage all qualified
beneficiaries to take advantage of the continued coverage, the effect
of a minority of adverse selectors will be diluted considerably. In the
alternative, if employers are unsupportive of continuation coverage,
they may expect to feel the effect of the continuation of those with
great present medical needs who cannot afford to do without such
coverage.
Employers seem to have a dilemma: either encourage continua-
tion by those eligible (and possibly endure higher administrative
costs), or discourage continuation (and suffer the unmitigated effects
of adverse selection). On closer inspection, however, the dilemma is
not so onerous. Adverse selection is not a completely unexpected by-
128. See Good Faith Efforts, supra note 88, at 1153.
129. For a discussion of the maximum duration of continuation coverage, see supra
notes 81-89 and accompanying text.
130. Jenson, supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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product of COBRA. Congress anticipated adverse selection, and
tried to minimize its effect by allowing for annual adjustment of pre-
miums."1' This permits the group plan to respond to an increased
burden sustained through continuation coverage.
2. The Scope of COBRA.-Critics also argue that COBRA
encompasses small plans that might be more sensitive to increases in
administrative costs. Because COBRA only exempts plans sponsored
by very small employers, 3 2 all except the smallest of employers are
affected by COBRA. Congress' choice in including even relatively
small employers demonstrates the importance it places on the expan-
sion of health insurance.
The statutory language concerning small plans has been criti-
cized by members of multiple employer plans and "Association
Plans."'33 Such plans are usually sponsored by employers too small
to individually sponsor a group health plan. If any of the employers
meets the 20-employee minimum, all of the employers, including
those who do not employ 20 or more people, would have to comply
with COBRA. 34 Others are critical of the inclusion of self-insured
plans. Self-insurers are exempt from the various state statutes that
mandate continuation coverage. Urging consistency, some critics
have suggested that self-insureds also be removed from the scope of
COBRA.3
3. Eligibility as a Qualified Beneficiary.-Some critics focus
on the classes of qualified beneficiaries.' 3 a Employers are troubled
131. Borzi, supra note 3, at I. For a further discussion of premium adjustments, see
supra notes 90-94 and accompanying text.
132. For a further discussion of the plans that are exempted from the reach of COBRA,
see supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
133. An "Association Plan" is one in which a group of small employers, who would
otherwise be unable to afford to sponsor a group health plan on their own, join together to
sponsor a plan for the entire group of small businesses. See Calloway, supra note 118.
134. The Health Insurance Association of America ("HIAA") recommends an amend-
ment that would exempt any employer with fewer than 20 employees, regardless of what type
of group health plan they sponsor. Health Insurance Association of America, COBRA Amend-
ments 4 (July 15, 1986) (unpublished memorandum of suggested COBRA amendments, as
formulated by the HIAA Ad Hoc Taskforce on group consortium; available through HIAA,
1025 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Washington, D.C. 20036) [hereinafter HIAA].
135. Wenner, supra note 67.
136. Specifically, the critics ire is provoked by including in the class of qualified benefi-
ciaries individuals who have voluntarily terminated their employment or were fired for behav-
ior characterized as less than "gross misconduct." In both cases, critics argue that it is inap-
propriate to force the employer to continue to offer benefits to former employees and their
dependents. Geisel, supra note 110. See also American Council of Life Insurance ("ACLI")/
Health Insurance Association of America ("HIA")) Joint Committee on COBRA, COBRA
Technicals, 4 (August 1986) (unpublished agenda of proposed amendments to COBRA; avail-
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that an employee fired for misconduct falls under the protection of
COBRA. 13 7 Other criticisms focus on the inclusion of employees who
voluntarily terminate employment. Opponents claim that this quali-
fied beneficiary does not experience an unexpected loss of health in-
surance, and does not merit Congressional protection. Yet despite
this criticism, none have criticized the inclusion of divorced spouses
as qualified beneficiaries. As one critic noted about this inclusion,
"It's an apple-pie law; who can oppose it?"'138
With the possible exception of widowed spouses, no other class
of qualified beneficiaries is more in need of continuation privileges
than are divorced spouses. Although hardly victims of a sudden loss
in coverage (as are widowed spouses), divorced spouses are often un-
able to obtain alternative private or group coverage. COBRA pre-
vents this harsh result by providing reasonably priced medical pro-
tection. Until the ex-spouse is suitably covered by another group
policy or Medicare, COBRA provides three more years of peace of
mind than many ex-spouses could otherwise afford.
Following the lead of many state continuation laws, 39 employ-
ers are seeking to amend COBRA to require a qualified beneficiary
to be enrolled in the group health plan for a minimum time period
before continuation coverage becomes available."'4 Employers fear
that without a minimum vesting period, employees may abuse the
continuation privileges by working only a short period, resigning, and
then continuing their health coverage for the eighteen months al-
able through ACLI, 1850 K St., NW, Washington, D.C.) [hereinafter ACLI Technicals].
Although this argument is meritorious, the statutory inclusion of these people further illus-
trates the Congressional policy argument that it is better to insure these people against health
risks than to allow them to go without insurance. It should be emphasized that continuation
coverage is elective, not mandatory, for the qualified beneficiary. Hence, a covered employee
who voluntarily leaves a company in favor of employment elsewhere is unlikely to burden the
former employer by electing continuing coverage. Instead the former employee likely will en-
roll in a plan offered by the new employer.
137. For a discussion of the gross misconduct standard, see supra note 79 and accompa-
nying text.
138. Wenner, supra note 67.
139. For a list of the various state continuation coverage laws, see supra note 16 and
accompanying text.
140. The American Council of Life Insurance has joined with the Health Insurance
Association of America in recommending that an employee be employed for six months before
the employee or her dependents qualify for continuation coverage. ACLI Technicals, supra
note 136. Such an amendment is unnecessary, because individual plans can accomplish this
goal without statutory assistance. Most employee health plans already require a minimum
service period before an employee is eligible to enroll in the group plan. The most common
minimum period is 30 days, although some plans require a minimum period of 60 to 90 days.
Id. The Association of Private Pension and Welfare Plans also recommends such an amend-
ment. Association of Private Pension and Welfare Plans ("APPWP"), Continuation of Health
Coverage Technical Amendments 1-2 (August I, 1986) [hereinafter APPWP Technicals].
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lowed."4 But this argument is premised on the fallacy that people
seek employment primarily for the purpose of acquiring health insur-
ance, and that upon acquiring coverage, they will cease working.
This theory overlooks the economic reality of the working
community.
IV. Coexistence of Federal and State Laws
An issue of great concern to employers and administrators in
many states is the potential preemption of state statutes by COBRA.
COBRA does not address the interaction of state and federal contin-
uation laws. As discussed above,142 six states have enacted statutes
that require continuation privileges for divorced spouses. But CO-
BRA not only affects divorced spouses, but also widowed spouses,
terminated employees, and emancipated minors. 43 Although only six
states have continuation coverage statutes that affect divorced
spouses, another seven states require continuation coverage for other
persons (such as widows, fired employees, striking laborers, and
others). "
To the extent that state laws apply to the same group plans as
COBRA, state statutes are preempted by COBRA by virtue of the
supremacy clause of the United States Constitution. 46 Some states,
however, allow a qualifying beneficiary to elect continuation cover-
age for a period longer than the federal law allows. 46 These provi-
sions are not constitutionally superseded by COBRA. Employers and
administrators claim that compliance with both COBRA and these
more generous state laws is oppressive. The Health Insurance Asso-
ciation of America ("HIAA") recites the following criticism:
These dual and inconsistent requirements will, to the extent
both can be administered, add unnecessary but substantial ad-
141. Individuals who become a qualified beneficiary by virtue of termination of employ-
ment may continue for only 18 months, whereas a divorced spouse may continue for 36
months. See note 90 and accompanying text.
142. For a discussion of state continuation statutes that affect divorced spouses, see
supra note 16 and accompanying text.
143. I.R.C. § 162(k)(3) (.West Supp. 1986). For a further discussion of those who benefit
from COBRA, see suprg notes 82-89 and accompanying text.
144. For a list of state continuation statutes that apply to other classes of beneficiaries,
see supra note 16 and accompanying text.
145. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. The supremacy clause provides that "This Constitution,
and all Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the
supreme Law of the Land ....
146. For example, in Illinois, a divorced-spouse over the age of 55 may continue on the
group health plan until the age of 65. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, § 979.2(E) (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1986).
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ministrative costs, perpetuate the substantive differences in the
treatment of insured and self-insured plans and the beneficiaries
thereunder, create undue complexities for plan operation by em-
ployers and plan administrators, be terribly confusing to individ-
ual beneficiaries and create a system lacking in basic fairness as
to beneficiaries as a class."'
HIAA proposes an amendment to COBRA which would declare
that the federal provisions completely preempt state law continuation
requirements if the employer's plan is subject to COBRA.' 8 The
American Council of Life Insurance,' 9 the Association of Private
Pension and Welfare Plans ("APPWP"),'50 the Group Health Asso-
ciation of America,' 5' and the National Association of Third-Party
Administrators 5 2 have joined in support of a federal preemption
amendment.
The above mentioned interest groups are justified when they be-
moan the administrative nightmares of reconciling various state laws
with COBRA. Each of the states that have some sort of continua-
tion-coverage law presents its own unique problems for administra-
tors. For example, Illinois allows a plan that provides continuation
coverage to a divorced spouse over the age of fifty-five to charge an
extra twenty percent of the premium (i.e., 120 percent) after two
years of coverage.' 53 An administrator may justifiably wonder
whether this allowance comports with COBRA's limit of a 102 per-
cent premium. 54 In Louisiana, where a widowed spouse over the age
of fifty can continue on a group health plan for many years,'55 there
is no allowance for a premium above that charged other group plan
members.' 56 The employer may reasonably wonder whether they
must actually reduce the premium (from 102 percent to 100 per-
cent) for those widows who continue longer than the 36 months pro-
vided by COBRA. A myriad of similar, unresolved issues confronts
the administrator who must abide by both federal and state laws.
Congress was aware of the existence of state continuation cover-
147. See HIAA, supra note 134, at 3.
148. Id. at I.
149. ACLI Technicals, supra note 136.
150. APPWP Technicals, supra note 140.
151. Telephone interview with Erling Hansen, Esquire, General Counsel, Group Health
Association of America (October 21, 1986).
152. Gilliland, supra note III.
153. ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 73, § 979.2(E) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986).
154. For a discussion of the premiums COBRA allows, see supra notes 101-105 and
accompanying text.
155. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:215.7 (West Supp. 1986).
156. Id.
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age statutes.15 7 The Congressional failure to expressly preempt these
state laws seems intentional. This failure affirms the notion that fed-
eral and state laws must find a way to peacefully coexist. Congres-
sional attention to this problem is needed to resolve confusion and
prevent administrators from adopting redundant and inefficient pro-
cedures to comply with both levels of law.
Both federal and state governments have a legitimate interest in
the health insurance coverage of their citizenry. It is appropriate
that this concern has been manifested in statutes. But it is costly,
administratively difficult, and inefficient for plan administrators to
comply with overlapping state and federal regulations. When CO-
BRA does not override the state legislation, the difficulty of recon-
ciling the two laws remains.
V. Proposed Solution
A possible reconciliation of federal and state interests might be
for Congress to adopt the spirit of Erie v. Tompkins.158 On the one
hand, in the administration and procedure of contintuation cover-
age,1"9 COBRA and the regulations promulgated thereunder should
govern during the entire period that an individual continues coverage
under either federal or state law.'6 0 On the other hand, in substan-
tive matters,' 61 when the Constitution does not mandate federal pre-
emption, the state law should prevail. 62
COBRA's procedural provisions are more thorough and com-
plete than any state continuation law. Indeed, many state continua-
157. The Senate Report recognizes the state laws when it notes "[tihis [period of contin-
uation] includes, and is not in addition to, the continuation period presently permitted by the
plan or under local law." S. REP. No. 146, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. 365 (1985).
158. Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). This landmark case estab-
lished the present civil procedure practice of federal courts. Under Erie, federal courts, when
exercising diversity jurisdiction, apply federal rules of civil procedure, and apply the substan-
tive law of the appropriate state.
159. Procedural matters would include the requirements for notice, election, and pre-
mium payment. These requirements are procedural because they define how COBRA shall be
exercised rather than defining substantive rights of continuation coverage.
160. Under this proposal, when a state has procedural guidelines in areas that are unad-
dressed by COBRA, the state's rules of procedure should be followed. When COBRA (or the
regulations issued thereunder) addresses a procedural issue, however, the federal law should
supersede contrary state provisions.
161. Matters that are not procedural would constitute matters of substance. These in-
clude, inter alia: who may elect continuation coverage, the duration of coverage, and the pre-
mium rate.
162. By virtue of the supremacy clause, federal law preempts any state legislation that
overlaps COBRA's provisions. See supra note 145 and accompanying text. Therefore, state
substantive law will only prevail when it allows a longer period of continuation than required
by COBRA, or applies to different group health plans than COBRA, or extends continuation
coverage to different individuals than permitted by COBRA.
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tion laws fail to address procedural issues at all. This proposal would
provide administrative uniformity for plans in all states during the
continuation coverage of the participants. There would be no need to
follow one set of guidelines for individuals continuing under CO-
BRA, and another for individuals continuing under a state law. Uni-
form procedures are more cost-efficient, and easier for plan adminis-
trators to implement and manage.
When substantive continuation rights are concerned, the will of
the state should be honored whenever it is constitutionally possible.
When a state's substantive provisions differ from COBRA, those
state provisions should prevail once the individual's COBRA rights
have expired. For example, if the state allows the right to continue
longer than COBRA allows, the qualified beneficiary would be per-
mitted to exhaust the time period allowed by both federal and state
laws.163 If the state's premium calculations are different than CO-
BRA's, the state's rate could then be charged to continuing partici-
pants after their COBRA rights expire. 4
This proposal respects both federal and state interests. It ac-
commodates employers and plan administrators by simplifying their
responsibilities, yet does not diminish the continuation rights that
have been conferred upon deserving classes of group participants by
either the federal or state governments. In this respect, qualified ben-
eficiaries would get the maximum protection against the loss of
health insurance that either body of law allows. In addition, employ-
ers would not have to cope with a web of inconsistent state adminis-
trative requirements which serve to increase the burden that they
already shoulder.
VI. Conclusion
Divorced spouses, many of whom would lose their valuable
health care coverage upon the termination of their marriage to a
covered employee, have been greatly assisted by Congress. COBRA
provides greater protection against the loss of health insurance than
163. One set of guidelines will provide greater efficiency and simplify the administrative
burden. In states that allow continuation for a longer period of time than COBRA, there
would be no need to utilize one administrative system while the qualified beneficiary continued
under federal law, and then switch to a state administrative system when their COBRA rights
have terminated.
164. For example, in Illinois, widowed spouses over the age of 55 would be charged no
more than the COBRA maximum of 102 percent during the three years that the COBRA
provisions govern. Then, while enjoying continuation coverage under the state statute, these
spouses could be charged up to 120 percent. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, § 979.2(E) (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1986).
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they previously had in any jurisdiction. Despite the urgings of well-
organized employer lobbies, the broad, remedial scope of COBRA
should not be curtailed. Although continuation coverage burdens em-
ployers with additional administrative costs, the social value of offer-
ing affordable, private group insurance through this vehicle vastly
outweighs the burden. Divorce is a traumatic, life-changing event.
By relieving divorced spouses' concerns about health insurance, CO-
BRA makes it a little easier for them to get back on their feet and
forge a new life.
William D. Kennedy
